And yes I’ve wondered along similar lines regarding Jung’s integration. During my psychoanalysis, my analyst once yelled at me in exasperation that I was supposed to resolve the tension of opposites. It makes me laugh now but at the time it was confusing. I left analysis soon after because I had the sense that Jung’s approach (or perhaps more accurately, its interpretation and application) was too limited and limiting. Too Platonic. I still love reading Jung, but I am more critical than I ever thought I would dare to be. Have you read Kingsley’s Catafalque?
Writing this essay was a transformative experience. Nietzsche's reimagining of "good and evil" as "sickness and health" offer a more coherent and grounded framework for evaluation. The traditional dichotomy of good and evil fails without the metaphysical underpinnings it once relied on—a system we can no longer credibly uphold. But, sickness and health find their legitimacy in the solid foundation of Charles Darwin's evolutionary theory, connecting this new standard of evaluation to observable reality (as well as having the benefit of enhancing life rather than being in conflict with it).
Wow your therapist really said that!? Talk about unresolved opposites. This is why Freud said the analyst should be analyzed. My experience with Jungian individuation was similar. It seemed to limiting but I never had an analyst. The few I spoke with seemed off their rocker (also I've noticed that Jungian analysts lean far left which is really strange if you think about it). Personally, I've found Nietzsche's endless process of personal evolution to be more fitting for me. I'm thinking about writing an essay about what Nietzschean therapy might look like.
I've heard whisperings of Jung's antisemitism but never looked into it. Jung's rebellion went beyond Freud and extended to Nietzsche as well.
Jung reminds me of Jordan Peterson in many ways. I was musing on this topic one day and jotted down the following:
Jordan Peterson is desperate to squeeze the last drops from dead concepts and outdated forms. He is too fixed on the past, and so he cannot see a viable path forward.
If we let go of these relics, we may rediscover their essence anew. By looking forward, by engaging with life openly and creatively, we’ll find that the true spirit of ancient myths and motifs can reappear—but in a form suited to our present, brimming with vitality. This is to live artistically, to bring old traditions to life by reimagining them for our own age (this is the sort of life Nietzsche promoted).
The fixation on reviving medieval traditions misses the point; these forms are no longer suited to our times. They need to be re-created with energy that we can use to shape a new culture, new art, new philosophy—in short, a new way of life. The fear of their loss is unfounded—perhaps even neurotic. We will remember these ancient truths, but under names of our own making. The old labels carry too much baggage; the real wisdom, once freed from dead symbols, will find its way back to us.
As psychologists Jung and Peterson were/are aware that clinging to the past is a neurotic reaction that hinders psychological development.
Re: “(This raises an interesting question: Does this critique exclude Jung? Jung’s idea of integration seems to aim for equilibrium, but equilibrium could signify an end to development, change, and transformation—qualities Nietzsche associates with life and growth. Could this make Jung’s philosophy a symptom of the same sick philosophies that seek a definitive endpoint? I’d love to hear your thoughts on this.)”
Thanks for your exposition on Nietzsche’s revaluation of conventional morality in terms of greater health. I also concur with your suspicion that the physician Jung’s views (e.g., on ‘equilibrium/integration’) are symptoms of decadence, not health.
Never mind that J is intellectually disordered — for example, what is the relation between ’individuation’ and ’archetypes’? To say that these two opposing concepts require integration or balance is vague and useless.
More seriously, J may be understood as a deep reaction against, and desexualization of, Freud’s rediscovery of Dionysian embodiment, albeit with an Apollonian — moralist — detachment (it’s no accident that F said no one understood the human condition more deeply than Nietzsche).
Jung’s sickness, as you suggest, is driven by his resentment of Freud’s insistence on the power of bodily instincts — Eros and Thanatos — in mental/emotional life. Hence when F emphasizes bisexuality, Jung whitewashes this as “anima/animus.” In other words, J suffers from castration anxiety as a function of his rebellion against the paternalistic Freud: thus J emasculates Freud’s rude physicality.
Freud and Nietzsche were both greatly concerned with guilt and its role in illness, while Jung drew back from this tragic worldview.
It’s worth mentioning that J’s antisemitism (an ideology that Nietzsche staunchly condemned) is thinly veiled hostility toward Freud (J claimed Freudian psychoanalysis could never be valid because it was invented by a Jew) and it led to J’s years of collaboration with the Nazis (i.e. his editorship of Nazi-sympathetic journal during the war). I adduce this fact as a concrete consequence of J’s conceptual decadence and as evidence of his profoundly un-Nietzschean sensibility.
And yes I’ve wondered along similar lines regarding Jung’s integration. During my psychoanalysis, my analyst once yelled at me in exasperation that I was supposed to resolve the tension of opposites. It makes me laugh now but at the time it was confusing. I left analysis soon after because I had the sense that Jung’s approach (or perhaps more accurately, its interpretation and application) was too limited and limiting. Too Platonic. I still love reading Jung, but I am more critical than I ever thought I would dare to be. Have you read Kingsley’s Catafalque?
This is a wonderful, life affirming essay! Thank you. So many intuitions and inklings I have been playing with are corroborated here.
Writing this essay was a transformative experience. Nietzsche's reimagining of "good and evil" as "sickness and health" offer a more coherent and grounded framework for evaluation. The traditional dichotomy of good and evil fails without the metaphysical underpinnings it once relied on—a system we can no longer credibly uphold. But, sickness and health find their legitimacy in the solid foundation of Charles Darwin's evolutionary theory, connecting this new standard of evaluation to observable reality (as well as having the benefit of enhancing life rather than being in conflict with it).
Wow your therapist really said that!? Talk about unresolved opposites. This is why Freud said the analyst should be analyzed. My experience with Jungian individuation was similar. It seemed to limiting but I never had an analyst. The few I spoke with seemed off their rocker (also I've noticed that Jungian analysts lean far left which is really strange if you think about it). Personally, I've found Nietzsche's endless process of personal evolution to be more fitting for me. I'm thinking about writing an essay about what Nietzschean therapy might look like.
I'm not familiar with the book you mentioned.
I've heard whisperings of Jung's antisemitism but never looked into it. Jung's rebellion went beyond Freud and extended to Nietzsche as well.
Jung reminds me of Jordan Peterson in many ways. I was musing on this topic one day and jotted down the following:
Jordan Peterson is desperate to squeeze the last drops from dead concepts and outdated forms. He is too fixed on the past, and so he cannot see a viable path forward.
If we let go of these relics, we may rediscover their essence anew. By looking forward, by engaging with life openly and creatively, we’ll find that the true spirit of ancient myths and motifs can reappear—but in a form suited to our present, brimming with vitality. This is to live artistically, to bring old traditions to life by reimagining them for our own age (this is the sort of life Nietzsche promoted).
The fixation on reviving medieval traditions misses the point; these forms are no longer suited to our times. They need to be re-created with energy that we can use to shape a new culture, new art, new philosophy—in short, a new way of life. The fear of their loss is unfounded—perhaps even neurotic. We will remember these ancient truths, but under names of our own making. The old labels carry too much baggage; the real wisdom, once freed from dead symbols, will find its way back to us.
As psychologists Jung and Peterson were/are aware that clinging to the past is a neurotic reaction that hinders psychological development.
Re: “(This raises an interesting question: Does this critique exclude Jung? Jung’s idea of integration seems to aim for equilibrium, but equilibrium could signify an end to development, change, and transformation—qualities Nietzsche associates with life and growth. Could this make Jung’s philosophy a symptom of the same sick philosophies that seek a definitive endpoint? I’d love to hear your thoughts on this.)”
Thanks for your exposition on Nietzsche’s revaluation of conventional morality in terms of greater health. I also concur with your suspicion that the physician Jung’s views (e.g., on ‘equilibrium/integration’) are symptoms of decadence, not health.
Never mind that J is intellectually disordered — for example, what is the relation between ’individuation’ and ’archetypes’? To say that these two opposing concepts require integration or balance is vague and useless.
More seriously, J may be understood as a deep reaction against, and desexualization of, Freud’s rediscovery of Dionysian embodiment, albeit with an Apollonian — moralist — detachment (it’s no accident that F said no one understood the human condition more deeply than Nietzsche).
Jung’s sickness, as you suggest, is driven by his resentment of Freud’s insistence on the power of bodily instincts — Eros and Thanatos — in mental/emotional life. Hence when F emphasizes bisexuality, Jung whitewashes this as “anima/animus.” In other words, J suffers from castration anxiety as a function of his rebellion against the paternalistic Freud: thus J emasculates Freud’s rude physicality.
Freud and Nietzsche were both greatly concerned with guilt and its role in illness, while Jung drew back from this tragic worldview.
It’s worth mentioning that J’s antisemitism (an ideology that Nietzsche staunchly condemned) is thinly veiled hostility toward Freud (J claimed Freudian psychoanalysis could never be valid because it was invented by a Jew) and it led to J’s years of collaboration with the Nazis (i.e. his editorship of Nazi-sympathetic journal during the war). I adduce this fact as a concrete consequence of J’s conceptual decadence and as evidence of his profoundly un-Nietzschean sensibility.
Thanks for the stimulating article.